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Salvaging the North Carolina 
Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute 
ABSTRACT 
In 2012, the North Carolina General Assembly criminalized student 
Internet activity intended to “torment” school employees.  This Comment 
contends that the legislation violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  It violates the First Amendment because it creates both 
subject matter and viewpoint limitations on speech.  It violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the requirement that the student must 
intend to “torment” a school employee creates an impermissibly vague 
standard. 
 
This Comment suggests that the North Carolina General Assembly could 
correct the constitutional deficiencies in the legislation through revisions 
that limit punishment to “true threats.”  Such revisions would reign in the 
broad coverage of the statute, while still protecting school employees and 
school systems from the most serious and disruptive online student 
misconduct. 
INTRODUCTION 
Students have long engaged in irreverent put-downs of their teachers.1  
In the past, students whispered these things to each other in the cafeteria, at 
recess, or at home.  Today, students post these comments online. 
Consider the predicament faced by Chip Douglas, a former high 
school English teacher in the Mecklenburg County School System.2  One of 
his students created a fake social-media account on Twitter3 under 
Douglas’s name.4  The Twitter profile, made available to the public online, 
portrayed Douglas as a hypersexual, violent drug addict.5  While students 
 
 1. See Adam Cohen, Why Students Have a Right to Mock Teachers Online, TIME (June 
20, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2078636,00.html. 
 2. See Lisa Miller, Cyberbullying Law Shields Teachers from Student Tormentors, 
NPR (Feb. 19, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/19/172329526/cyber-bulling- 
law-shields-teachers-from-student-tormentors. 
 3. TWITTER, https://twitter.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
 4. See Miller, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
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may have viewed the fake Twitter profile as a mere prank, Douglas took it 
seriously—especially when students in his classroom laughed at him.6  
Douglas eventually resigned.7 
The North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation titled “An 
Act to Enact the School Violence Prevention Act of 2012” to prohibit the 
type of student Internet activity that tormented Chip Douglas.8  The law 
criminalizes various forms of student Internet activity conducted “[w]ith 
the intent to intimidate or torment a school employee.”9  The new law 
stands as one-of-a-kind.  While student-on-student cyberbullying statutes 
have become commonplace across the country, no other state legislature 
has passed a criminal law solely aimed at protecting school employees 
from the Internet activity of their students.10 
This Comment argues that the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying 
statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process 
Clause and the First Amendment.  Because the open-ended intent-to-
torment requirement fails to put the public on notice of what conduct is 
prohibited, the statute violates void-for-vagueness principles encompassed 
in the Due Process Clause, allowing for arbitrary enforcement.11  The 
statute also violates the First Amendment as a content-based restriction on 
speech: it restricts speech based on both subject matter and viewpoint, 
proscribing only speech that is intimidating or tormenting to school 
employees, and only speech made by students.12 
This Comment also suggests a solution: the statute should be revised 
to punish only true threats,13 which do not receive constitutional 
 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715. 
 9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013); see also id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(4), (5). 
 10. See Kevin P. Brady, Commentary, Criminal State Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes: 
Does Legislative Zeal Outweigh Constitutional Considerations?, in 298 WEST’S EDUCATION 
LAW REPORTER 21, 26–35 (2014) (categorizing various legislative responses to cyberbullying 
and noting that North Carolina currently stands as the only state to pass a criminal statute 
aimed at protecting school employees from cyberbullying). 
 11. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that statutes 
must not be “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application” (first citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 
234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); then citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914))). 
 12. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983))). 
 13. “True threats” are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
2
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protection.14  This approach would also resolve due-process vagueness 
concerns, since courts have recognized and defined true threats.15  Thus, 
under a true-threat standard, students, parents, and law enforcement would 
be put on notice as to what the law prohibits. 
This Comment shows that the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying 
statute cannot pass constitutional muster as the law is currently written, but 
argues that prohibiting only students’ true threats against school employees 
can salvage it.  First, this Comment provides an overview of the North 
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute.16 Next, it recognizes two 
constitutional objections to the statute: the due process void-for-vagueness 
objection and the First Amendment free-speech objection.17  Finally, this 
Comment demonstrates how limiting the application of the statute to true 
threats can salvage the constitutional viability of the statute, while still 
protecting school employees and school systems from the most harmful 
and disruptive student Internet activity.18 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TEACHER-CYBERBULLYING STATUTE 
Generally speaking, North Carolina’s teacher-cyberbullying law 
prohibits various forms of student Internet activity that is intended to 
“intimidate or torment a school employee.”19  Students who violate the 
 
individual or group of individuals.”  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (first citing 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam); then citing R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 14. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (noting that “threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment”). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 53–163 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 164–203 and accompanying text. 
 19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013); see also id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(4), (5).  The 
operative language reads as follows: 
(b)  Except as otherwise made unlawful by this Article, it shall be unlawful for any 
student to use a computer or computer network to do any of the following: 
(1) With the intent to intimidate or torment a school employee, do any of the 
 following: 
 (a) Build a fake profile or Web site. 
 (b) Post or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or 
 sexual information pertaining to a school employee. 
 (c) Post a real or doctored image of the school employee on the 
 Internet. 
 (d) Access, alter, or erase any computer network, computer data, 
 computer program, or computer software, including breaking into a 
 password-protected account or stealing or otherwise accessing 
 passwords. 
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statute are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor,20 which can carry a sentence of 
up to sixty days in jail and a one-thousand-dollar fine.21  In addition to 
criminal punishment, the statute requires that the offending student be 
transferred to a different school.22  If no “appropriate school” is available, 
the student must be transferred to a different class or assigned a different 
teacher—one who was not a target of the student’s cyberbullying.23 
A. Legislative Purpose to Protect Children 
The teacher-cyberbullying law was part of 2012 short-session 
legislation aimed at preventing school violence.24  According to the 
legislation, “the sole purpose of [the] law is to protect all children from 
bullying and harassment, and no other legislative purpose is intended nor 
should any other intent be construed from passage of [the] law.”25  In other 
words, to achieve the purpose of protecting children, the General Assembly 
elected to impose criminal sanctions on children who bully adults. 
In support of the legislation, the North Carolina General Assembly 
found that “a safe and civil environment in school is necessary in order for 
students to learn and achieve high academic standards.”26  Further, bullying 
 
 (e) Use a computer system for repeated, continuing, or sustained 
 electronic communications, including electronic mail or other 
 transmissions, to a school employee. 
(2) Make any statement, whether true or false, intending to immediately 
provoke, and that is likely to provoke, any third party to stalk or harass a 
school employee. 
(3) Copy and disseminate, or cause to be made, an unauthorized copy of any 
data pertaining to a school employee for the purpose of intimidating or 
tormenting that school employee (in any form, including, but not limited 
to, any printed or electronic form of computer data, computer programs, or 
computer software residing in, communicated by, or produced by a 
computer or computer network). 
(4) Sign up a school employee for a pornographic Internet site with the intent 
to intimidate or torment the employee. 
(5) Without authorization of the school employee, sign up a school employee 
for electronic mailing lists or to receive junk electronic messages and 
instant messages, with the intent to intimidate or torment the school 
employee. 
Id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(1)–(5). 
 20. Id. § 14-458.2(c). 
 21. Id. § 15A-1340.23 (listing sentencing guidelines for various offense classifications). 
 22. Id. § 115C-366.4. 
 23. Id.  However, the statute also permits a superintendent to “modify, in writing, the 
required transfer of an individual student on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. 
 24. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
4
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and harassment “disrupt both a student’s ability to learn and a school’s 
ability to educate its students in a safe environment” by creating “a climate 
that fosters violence in our schools.”27  The General Assembly believed that 
it was necessary to pass this law to protect students and to provide them 
with the best possible learning environment.28 
B. The Scope of the North Carolina Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute 
Under the teacher-cyberbullying statute, criminal sanctions follow 
when (1) any student using a computer or computer network29 (2) engages 
in a form of the Internet activities contemplated in the statute30 (3) with an 
“intent to intimidate or torment a school employee.”31 
The statute defines the operative terms “student”32 and “school 
employee,”33 and enumerates the proscribed Internet activities.34  
Specifically, the Internet activities that the statute prohibits include 
building a fake profile or website;35 posting or encouraging others to post 
private information pertaining to a school employee;36 posting an image of 
a school employee;37 accessing, altering or erasing digital data;38 repeated 
electronic communications to a school employee;39 inciting the stalking or 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (“[I]t is essential to enact a law that seeks to protect the health and welfare of 
North Carolina students and improve the learning environment for North Carolina 
students.”). 
 29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b) (2013). 
 30. Id. §§ 14-458.2(b)(1)–(5) (listing various prohibited Internet activities). 
 31. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1).  Subsection (b)(2), which prohibits students from making “any 
statement, whether true or false, intending to immediately provoke, and that is likely to 
provoke, any third party to stalk or harass a school employee,” does not require a student to 
have an intent to intimidate or torment a school employee.  Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2).  All other 
Internet activities require a specific intent to intimidate or torment.  Id. § 14-458.2(b). 
 32. The term “student” includes persons assigned to a traditional public school, enrolled 
in a charter school or non-public school recognized by the state, as well as a person 
suspended or expelled from any of these within the last year.  Id. § 14-458.2(a)(2). 
 33. The term “school employee” includes any employee at a traditional public school, 
charter school, or non-public school recognized by the state, as well as independent 
contractors who carry out “duties customarily performed by employees of the school.”  Id. 
§ 14-458.2(a)(1). 
 34. Id. § 14-458.2(a). 
 35. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(a). 
 36. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(b). 
 37. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(c). 
 38. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(d). 
 39. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(e). 
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harassment of a school employee;40 copying and disseminating 
unauthorized data pertaining to a school employee;41 signing a school 
employee up for a pornographic Internet site;42 and signing a school 
employee up for junk e-mail and instant messages.43 
Thus, the statute makes relatively clear what persons qualify as 
students, what persons qualify as school employees, and what Internet 
activity the statute encompasses.  Not all operative requirements under the 
statute, however, are so well delineated. 
C.  The Meaning of “Intent to Intimidate or Torment a School Employee” 
The cyberbullying law fashions a specific-intent requirement—the 
“intent to intimidate or torment a school employee”44—that is defined 
neither by the statute nor by common law.  In North Carolina, specific-
intent crimes require “as an essential element a specific intent that a result 
be reached.”45  In this context, the student must desire that the school 
employee will be “intimidate[d] or torment[ed]” as a result of the online 
Internet activity.46  However, the General Assembly left the task of 
deciphering the meaning behind the statute’s “intent to intimidate or 
torment” requirement to the public.47 
The statute’s use of the word intimidate, standing alone, does not 
create interpretive ambiguities.  In North Carolina, “[i]ntimidate means to 
make timid or fearful, inspire or affect with fear, and to compel action or 
inactions as by threats.”48  Further, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has defined intimidate to mean “where a speaker directs a threat to a person 
or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 
harm or death.”49  Intimidate has been incorporated as an element in several 
crimes, ranging from threatening a witness50 to common-law robbery.51  As 
 
 40. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2). 
 41. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(3). 
 42. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(4). 
 43. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(5). 
 44. Id. § 14-458.2(b). 
 45. State v. Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826, 844 (N.C. 1994). 
 46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2. 
 47. See id. § 14-458.2(b). 
 48. St. John v. Brantley, 720 S.E.2d 754, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabr. 2002)). 
 49. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-226 (prohibiting the threatening of witnesses through 
intimidation). 
6
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such, an “intent to intimidate” requirement stands readily adaptable to the 
new criminal statute. 
Conversely, the “torment” requirement lacks a statutory definition, a 
settled legal meaning, or a common colloquial understanding.52  As written, 
it is unclear what the intent-to-torment requirement prohibits or how 
broadly it sweeps. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES 
Two particularly thorny constitutional problems arise from the North 
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute’s narrow subject matter and 
specific-intent requirement.53  First, the statute’s undefined specific-intent 
element, which requires an “intent to intimidate or torment a school 
employee,” invokes due-process concerns because it is unclear what 
actions constitute tormenting a school employee.54  Second, the statute 
creates an impermissible content-based restriction on speech because 
criminal sanctions depend on whether the speech relates to the subject 
matter of intimidating or tormenting a school employee from the viewpoint 
of students.55 
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due-Process Vagueness Concerns 
The statute’s “intent to torment a school employee” requirement 
violates due-process principles.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause requires that state criminal laws possess some minimum degree of 
definiteness.56  A statute must not be “so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”57  When a statute is both vague and restrictive of speech, 
 
 51. See State v. Rivens, 261 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. 1980) (explaining that robbery 
requires “violence or intimidation” (citing State v. Smith, 150 S.E.2d 194, 200 (N.C. 
1966))). 
 52. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (stating that vague statutes 
commonly lack “statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings” (first 
citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); then citing Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844, 870–71, 871 n.35 (1997))). 
 53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (citations omitted)). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)). 
 57. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (first citing Int’l Harvester Co., 234 U.S. at 221; then 
citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)); see also Papachristou v. City of 
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courts should be especially wary of the “obvious chilling effect on free 
speech.”58  The purpose behind the definiteness requirement is twofold: 
vague criminal statutes fail to place the public on notice of the prohibited 
conduct and they allow for arbitrary arrests and prosecutions.59 
The teacher-cyberbullying law violates this due-process definiteness 
requirement for the following reasons: (1) the meaning of the word torment 
lacks a common understanding, as demonstrated by a host of varying 
dictionary definitions; (2) the torment requirement is reminiscent of other 
vague statutes that have been struck down by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; (3) the extent of allowable speech under the statute depends 
on arbitrary circumstances, such as student location and a law enforcement 
officer’s personal predilections; and (4) North Carolina case law fails to 
clarify or limit the broad language of the statute. 
1.  Multitude of Dictionary Definitions 
The due-process problem with the North Carolina teacher-
cyberbullying statute is not that it may occasionally be difficult for fact-
finders to determine whether a student intends to torment their teacher.  
Rather, the problem is that it is difficult for students to determine what 
torment actually means.60  Because torment lacks a common understanding 
or plain meaning, as reflected by a multitude of varying dictionary 
definitions, a person of ordinary intelligence lacks fair notice of the type of 
conduct that the teacher-cyberbullying statute prohibits. 
For example, in State v. Watson,61 the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals looked to The American Heritage College Dictionary to define 
torment for the purpose of interpreting the felony-stalking statute.62  From 
that source, the court understood torment to mean “[t]o annoy, pester, or 
 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails various 
suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))). 
 58. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872; see also id. at 871–72 (explaining that “[t]he vagueness of 
such a [content-based] regulation,” coupled with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal 
statute, “raise[] special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on 
free speech”). 
 59. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (describing the 
two “discrete due process concerns” behind the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
 60. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (“What renders a statute 
vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the 
incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely 
what that fact is.”). 
 61. State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 62. Id. at 477 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1428 (3d ed. 
1997)). 
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/5
2015] SALVAGING THE TEACHER-CYBERBULLYING STATUTE 399 
harass.”63  This definition, however, is not the only understanding of the 
term.  Depending on which dictionary is consulted, the types of activity 
that may implicate the word torment range from the severe to the 
mundane—from subjecting others to medieval torture devices,64 to 
throwing others into a commotion,65 to causing mere annoyance or 
anxiety.66  The fact that no two dictionary definitions are consistent 
illustrates the lack of a common understanding of the word. 
Because torment lacks a uniform meaning, students, parents, teachers, 
and the general public have little notice as to what the teacher-
cyberbullying statute actually prohibits.  A student who intends to merely 
pester or annoy a teacher might not realize that, to some, her conduct could 
be interpreted as an intent to torment.67  The standard created under the 
statute is not merely imprecise; with drastically different connotations 
behind the word torment, the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute 
creates no workable standard for students and for the public to know what 
the law prohibits.  The statute “violates the first essential of due process of 
law”: the public must “guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”68 
2. Modern Equivalent to Coates v. City of Cincinnati 
The word torment as used in the statute is reminiscent of other laws 
that the Supreme Court of the United States has previously struck down as 
void for vagueness.69  The classic example of a hopelessly vague standard 
is found in Coates v. City of Cincinnati.70  In Coates, a city ordinance 
prohibited three or more people from assembling on a sidewalk and 
“conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.”71  
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Torment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
torment (last visited May 3, 2015). 
 65. Torment, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/torment (last 
visited May 3, 2015). 
 66. Torment, YOURDICTIONARY, http://www.yourdictionary.com/torment (last visited 
May 3, 2015). 
 67. See Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477 (“‘Torment’ is defined as ‘[t]o annoy, pester, or 
harass.’” (alteration in original) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 
supra note 62, at 1428)). 
 68. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 69. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down a statute as 
vague for use of the words “indecent” and “patently offensive”); Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down a statute as vague for use of the word 
“annoying”). 
 70. Coates, 402 U.S. 611. 
 71. Id. 
9
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart observed that “[c]onduct that 
annoys some people does not annoy others.”72  Ultimately, the Court found 
it constitutionally impermissible for criminal sanctions to depend on 
something as arbitrary as whether or not someone is annoyed.73 
The teacher-cyberbullying law stands as a contemporary equivalent to 
the city ordinance struck down in Coates.  Both the city ordinance in 
Coates and the teacher-cyberbullying statute in North Carolina impose 
criminal punishment on First Amendment rights based on a similar 
“unascertainable standard.”74  The meaning of torment as judicially defined 
by the North Carolina Court of Appeals includes the vague word annoy.75  
As detailed above, numerous other definitions of torment also rely on the 
word annoy.76  Because the statute’s torment requirement creates an 
unascertainable standard, like the word annoying, the reasoning in Coates 
should control.  If criminal sanctions cannot depend on a standard as 
arbitrary as whether someone is annoyed, they similarly cannot depend on 
a standard as arbitrary as whether a student intends to torment (or pester, 
annoy) a school employee. 
3.  Permissible Speech and Arbitrary Circumstances 
One of the primary reasons that the Due Process Clause forbids vague 
criminal laws is because they allow for arbitrary enforcement.77  The Due 
Process Clause requires “a legislature [to] establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement.”78  Vague criminal statutes “permit ‘a 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections.’”79 
 
 72. Id. at 614. 
 73. See id. (“[T]he ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to 
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in 
the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”). 
 74. See id. (striking down an ordinance as “unconstitutionally vague” where “it subjects 
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard”). 
 75. See State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472, 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); see also supra 
notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 77. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) 
(“[P]recision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory way.” (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–
09 (1972))). 
 78. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566, 574 (1974)). 
 79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575). 
10
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At best, inconsistent arrests can be expected to follow as a direct result 
of the uncertainty within the specific-intent requirement of the teacher-
cyberbullying statute.80  A school-resource officer in Robeson County may 
understand torment to mean “annoy excessively,”81 while a school-resource 
officer in Halifax County may apply the much more stringent definition of 
“extreme pain or anguish of body or mind.”82  As such, the officer in 
Robeson County would arrest a student for online comments that the 
officer in Halifax County would not believe amounted to more than a mere 
annoyance.  With statutory uncertainty, the extent of permissible online 
student speech may vary based on one’s county of residence or even the 
school-resource officer assigned to a particular school. 
At worst, a law-enforcement officer could use the uncertainty within 
the statute to justify penalizing a student that the officer dislikes.  An 
imprecise criminal statute “furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against groups 
deemed to merit their displeasure.’”83  A law-enforcement officer who, for 
whatever reason, holds a grudge against a certain student, would be able to 
take advantage of the vague statutory standard, taking a more relaxed view 
of the intent-to-torment requirement than he otherwise would.  Essentially, 
the uncertainty behind the intent-to-torment requirement invites arbitrary 
enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
4.  Lack of Guidance in the Case Law 
North Carolina case law fails to offer much guidance for interpreting 
the word torment.  In State v. Watson,84 the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals upheld the state’s felony-stalking statute85 in the face of due-
process objections.86  At that time, the felony-stalking statute criminalized 
the willful following or harassing of another person, with the intent to place 
a person in reasonable fear, or the intent to cause a person emotional 
distress.87  The parties in Watson disputed the meaning of the words 
 
 80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1) (2013) (stating the specific-intent 
requirement for the teacher-cyberbullying law); see also supra notes 44–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 81. Torment, DICTIONARY.COM, supra note 65. 
 82. Torment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 64. 
 83. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156, 170 (1972)). 
 84. State v. Watson, 610 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1) (repealed 2008). 
 86. Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477–78. 
 87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1). 
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harasses and harassment,88 and whether those terms complied with 
definiteness requirements under the Due Process Clause.89  The felony-
stalking statute defined harassment as communication “directed at a 
specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that 
serves no legitimate purpose.”90 
Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute failed to meet 
definiteness requirements, the North Carolina Court of Appeals defined the 
harassment statute’s use of the word torments to mean “annoy, pester, or 
harass.”91  This would be fine if the felony-stalking statute itself did not 
define harassment with reference to the word torment.92  A circular 
definition of torment that relies on the unconstitutionally vague word 
annoy93 is not particularly helpful in defining the specific-intent 
requirement within the cyberbullying context, because it fails to put the 
public on notice of the prohibited conduct. 
The felony-stalking statute, as construed in Watson, however, is 
distinguishable from the teacher-cyberbullying statute.  Although the 
felony-stalking statute used the word “torment,” that word was not an 
essential element of the crime.  Rather, the word was merely a part of the 
definition for the word harassment.94  The felony-stalking statute required 
placing a person in reasonable fear of harm or causing substantial 
emotional harm—a more readily definable standard.95 
The troubling result of the teacher-cyberbullying law’s imprecision is 
that a student familiar with the statute may avoid any sort of online 
criticism of school employees whatsoever.  Free speech is “delicate and 
vulnerable,” and “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [its] exercise almost 
as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”96  Aside from multiple 
inconsistent dictionary meanings, many of which define torment with 
 
 88. The felony-stalking statute defined harassment as communication “directed at a 
specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate 
purpose.”  Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 476 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-277.3(3)). 
 89. Id. at 476–77. 
 90. Id. at 476 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(3)). 
 91. Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 476. 
 93. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down the 
statute as vague for use of the word “annoying”). 
 94. Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 476. 
 95. Id. 
 96. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 872 (1997) (“The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain 
silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.” (citing 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965))). 
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reference to the already unconstitutionally vague word annoy,97 the public 
has little guidance for deciphering the word torment.  As such, “men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”98  The Due 
Process Clause requires more. 
B. First Amendment Freedom-of-Speech Concerns 
In addition to violating due-process definiteness requirements, the 
North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute violates the First Amendment 
guarantee of free speech.99  Freedom of speech “is the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”100  The 
teacher-cyberbullying statute violates this principal right by silencing 
speech of a particular viewpoint and subject matter. 
1.  Content-Based Restriction 
The North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute creates a selective, 
content-based limitation on speech, because criminal sanctions depend on 
whether the speech relates to the subject of intimidating or tormenting a 
school employee.  The law also discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, 
punishing only speech that is made by students, and only those students 
whose perspective toward school employees is negative. 
A law that burdens speech because of its content is “presumptively 
invalid” as an impermissible abridgment of freedom of speech.101  The First 
Amendment principle of content neutrality “prohibits the government from 
choosing the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion.”102  “[T]he 
content neutrality principle is invoked when the government has imposed 
restrictions on speech related to an entire subject area.”103  When a law 
 
 97. Compare Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (striking down statute as vague for use of the 
word annoying), with Watson, 610 S.E.2d at 477 (defining torment as used in the felony-
stalking statute to mean “annoy, pester, or harass”). 
 98. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (first citing Int’l Harvester 
Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); then citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234 
U.S. 634, 638 (1914)). 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 100. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 101. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations 
are presumptively invalid.”). 
 102. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983). 
 103. Id. 
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prohibits “particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of 
the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”104 
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that “a 
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”105  
North Carolina courts have been especially cautious in deciding cases 
involving abridgements of the freedom of speech.106  Such abridgments are 
particularly dangerous because they “pose the inherent risk that the 
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to 
suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate 
through coercion rather than persuasion.”107 
The First Amendment permits restrictions based on the content of 
speech in only “a few limited areas.”108  This narrow range of well-defined 
areas includes instances of incitement, obscenity, defamation, fighting 
words, child pornography, frauds, true threats, and speech presenting a 
grave and imminent threat to the government.109  No legislator possesses 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the 
scope of the First Amendment.”110 
The North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying law constitutes an 
impermissible subject-matter restriction on speech because it imposes a 
restriction on student speech that is outside the permissibly restricted 
categories.  The law proscribes an entire subject area: “intimidat[ing] or 
torment[ing] a school employee.”111  Speech concerning school employees 
 
 104. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391). 
 105. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2820 (2011) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 573 (1995)); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 64 (2006) (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573). 
 106. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (refusing to recognize “the 
constitutionally suspect private facts invasion of privacy tort”). See generally C. Calhoun 
Walters, Comment, A Remedy for Online Exposure: Recognizing the Public-Disclosure Tort 
in North Carolina, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 419, 429–37 (2015) (discussing North Carolina’s 
traditionally conservative approach to First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 107. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 108. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
382–83). 
 109. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing categories of 
unprotected speech). 
 110. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (‘“[T]he freedom of 
speech’ referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these 
traditional limitations.”). 
 111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2 (2013). 
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does not fall outside First Amendment protection.112  Nevertheless, the 
North Carolina General Assembly deemed speech that relates to the subject 
of intimidating or tormenting school employees inappropriate for student 
online discussion.113 
It remains permissible under the statute to direct intimidating and 
tormenting online remarks to another person, so long as that person is not a 
school employee.  For example, the statute does not impose criminal 
sanctions on a student who builds a fake social-media profile or website for 
a librarian employed at the county public library.  But criminal sanctions 
can follow if a student creates an identical profile or website for a librarian 
employed at the high school library.114  On its face, the statute constitutes a 
selective, content-based limitation on speech, since criminal sanctions are 
keyed to the subject matter of the speech––the intimidating or tormenting 
of a school employee. 
The statute also creates viewpoint discrimination that disfavors the 
views of specific speakers—students who voice negative feelings toward a 
school employee.  The Supreme Court of the United States describes 
viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content discrimination” 
where the law targets “particular views taken by speakers on a subject”115 
or “restrict[s] the expression of specific speakers.”116 As such, “[v]iewpoint 
discrimination is censorship in its purest form.”117 
Under the teacher-cyberbullying law, non-student members of the 
public are free to say what they wish about school employees—online or 
otherwise—regardless of whether they have the intent to torment a school 
employee.  A non-student who desires to intimidate or torment a school 
employee by posting a picture of that school employee online is not 
prohibited from doing so under the teacher-cyberbullying law.  But 
criminal sanctions can follow when a student posts that same picture of the 
school employee with the intent to intimidate or torment.118  Because the 
law criminalizes speech by students that would be legal if delivered by a 
non-student, the statute discriminates based on viewpoint. 
 
 112. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (listing categories of unprotected speech); see also 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (stating that the 
First Amendment “prohibits the government from choosing the subjects that are appropriate 
for public discussion”). 
 113. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2. 
 114. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(a). 
 115. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 391). 
 116. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000). 
 117. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(c). 
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While the public, including students, generally enjoys the right to 
speak freely on the Internet, students are now at risk of criminal sanctions 
if they speak ill of school employees online with a specified intent.119  
Because the law on its face burdens speech on the basis of subject matter 
and viewpoint, courts must hold the statute to exacting scrutiny.120 
2.  Strict Scrutiny and the Teacher-Cyberbullying Statute 
“[S]trict scrutiny leaves few survivors.”121  As a content-based, subject 
matter, and viewpoint restriction on free speech, the North Carolina 
teacher-cyberbullying law would not survive constitutional review.  Strict 
scrutiny imposes a high burden on state speech regulations, and “[i]t is rare 
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be 
permissible.”122  Strict scrutiny requires a statute that regulates speech 
based on its content to be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
governmental interest.123  If a less restrictive alternative would serve the 
government’s purpose, the legislature must employ that alternative.124 
As stated above, the enacting legislation states that the “sole purpose” 
of the teacher-cyberbullying law is to protect children from bullying and 
harassment, expressly disclaiming any other purpose.125  Punishing 
students, who are almost always children, for cyberbullying school 
employees, who are almost always adults, is not narrowly tailored to fit the 
General Assembly’s sole expressed purpose of “protect[ing] all 
children.”126  Under the teacher-cyberbullying statute, no child receives 
protection from bullying and harassment; in fact, children are only 
punished under the law.  Tenuous logic and a bit of imagination would be 
required to fathom situations where the law serves the purpose of 
protecting children.  To find a compelling governmental interest served by 
the statute, courts would have to ignore the statement in the legislation that 
 
 119. See id. § 14-458.2. 
 120. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (“When content-based 
speech regulation is in question . . . exacting scrutiny is required.”). 
 121. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 122. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S 803, 818 (2000). 
 123. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that the 
government may “regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest”). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715; see also supra text 
accompanying note 25. 
 126. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715. 
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provides “no other legislative purpose . . . be construed from passage of 
this law.”127 
Within the legislative findings, the General Assembly identified 
several other potential governmental interests that might be advanced by 
the teacher-cyberbullying statute.128  Specifically, the findings noted the 
importance of fostering the optimal learning environment for children, 
while also serving their general welfare.129  The General Assembly found 
that “a safe and civil environment in school is necessary in order for 
students to learn.”130  The bill also noted that permitting bullying in any 
form promotes the potential for school violence.131  Thus, if one discounts 
the General Assembly’s “sole purpose” proviso,132 it is clear that the law 
seeks to protect the health and welfare of students and school employees 
for the purpose of improving the learning environment. 
A compelling interest has been described as an interest “of the highest 
order,”133 an “overriding state interest,”134 and an “unusually important 
interest.”135  The Supreme Court has recognized education as “perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments.”136  As such, this 
Comment assumes that protecting the health and welfare of school 
employees for the purpose of improving the learning environment 
constitutes a compelling state interest.  It does not follow, however, that 
imposing criminal sanctions on students who intend to intimidate or 
torment a school employee on the Internet is sufficiently tailored to 
protecting that interest.137 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (“[I]t is essential to enact a law that seeks to protect the health and welfare of 
North Carolina students and improve the learning environment for North Carolina 
students.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (stating that “bullying and harassing behaviors create a climate that fosters 
violence in our schools” and “national data and anecdotal evidence have established the 
need to identify the most vulnerable targets and potential victims of bullying and 
harassment”). 
 132. See id.; supra text accompanying note 25. 
 133. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 134. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (citing First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)). 
 135. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 136. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 137. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“[T]he mere fact that a statutory 
regulation of speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children . . . does 
not foreclose inquiry into its validity.” (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 129 (1989))). 
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While fostering an optimal educational environment is undeniably a 
worthy legislative goal, the teacher-cyberbullying statute fails to achieve 
that goal because it does not actually deter teacher cyberbullying.  Despite 
the “national data and anecdotal evidence” cited in the legislation,138 
research suggests that criminal sanctions are not an effective means to 
combat cyberbullying, because such measures have no deterrent effect on 
students.139  While the law punishes student cyberbullies with potential jail 
time, the threat of harsh punishment will not cross most students’ minds 
when they post content on the Internet about school employees.140 
It is generally agreed that adolescent brains have not “yet fully 
developed to the point where we can assume rationality in the face of 
unknown or unlikely consequences.”141  The Supreme Court of the United 
States also recognized this principle when, in the context of a juvenile 
death-penalty case, it suggested that “[t]he likelihood that the teenage 
offender has made the kind of . . . cost-benefit analysis . . . is so remote as 
to be virtually nonexistent.”142 
Students are especially unlikely to consider the consequences of their 
online actions.  Adolescent students, as social media users, often do not 
even realize the potential breadth of their online audience.143  Many people, 
including students, post online under the false belief that only “friends” 
will ever look at their content.144  Exacerbating this problem, many 
commonly used social-media websites, such as Twitter, design their 
 
 138. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715. 
 139. See, e.g., John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free 
Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 90 (2011) (“Rather than attempting to legislate cyber 
bullying out of existence (a quixotic dream), a more productive approach would be one that 
is proactive and educational, while seeking to guide young people in the responsible use of 
new technology.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. 
L. REV. 385, 385 (2012) (arguing that criminal penalties “are unlikely to solve the problem 
of bullying and cyberbullying in schools and unlikely to succeed as effective punishments”). 
 140. See Waldman, supra note 139, at 434. 
 141. Justin W. Patchin, Deterring Teen Bullying: Dos and Don’ts, CYBERBULLYING RES. 
CTR. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://cyberbullying.us/deterring-bullying/. 
 142. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988). 
 143. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2009) (stating that technology “permit[s] users to create social 
networks with ‘blurry edges’—places where they post information generally intended for a 
small network of friends and family, but which is left available to the whole world to 
access”). 
 144. See id. at 1329 (“[T]he design of [social media] sites creates an aura of privacy by 
suggesting they are for limited disclosure of information to a defined social network of 
‘friends.’”). 
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privacy controls in such a way that users of the site do not deploy them.145  
Moreover, the Internet’s “disinhibiting effect” is well documented.  Users, 
including students, do not hesitate to post messages online that they would 
never say in person.146 
Unaware of their audience and emboldened in a virtual world, 
students who are subject to criminal punishment for cyberbullying remain 
unlikely to stop and weigh the consequences before posting online about a 
school employee.  Thus, criminal sanctions fail to deter teacher 
cyberbullying.  In fact, the law achieves no purpose beyond the punishment 
and retribution of student offenders.147 
Criminal punishment of students who cyberbully school employees is 
not narrowly tailored if it can be replaced with a less restrictive alternative, 
such as school administrative punishment.148  North Carolina law already 
requires local educators to address the problem of cyberbullying on a 
school administrative level.149  Specifically, schools must “develop and 
implement methods and strategies for promoting school environments that 
are free of bullying or harassing behavior.”150  Public school systems across 
the state have developed ways to address the problem of cyberbullying 
through school discipline. 
The Wake County School Board’s disciplinary policies, for example, 
apply to any student “whose conduct at any time, place, or cyberspace, on 
or off campus, has or is reasonably expected to have a direct and immediate 
impact on the orderly and efficient operation of the schools or the safety of 
individuals in the school environment.”151  This succinct policy 
encompasses online posts and avoids burdening a student with a criminal 
 
 145. Id. at 1328–29 (first citing Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software 
Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 583, 589–97 (2006); then citing Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, 
Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks, 2005 ACM WORKSHOP ON 
PRIVACY ELECTRONIC SOC’Y 71, 74–78). 
 146. John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 321, 321 
(2004) (“Everyday users on the Internet––as well as clinicians and researchers––have noted 
how people say and do things in cyberspace that they wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the 
face-to-face world.”). 
 147. See Waldman, supra note 139, at 434 (“[A]ntibullying criminal laws seem to lack 
all indicia of good criminal laws other than their provision of retributive value.”). 
 148. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S 803, 815 (2000) (“[I]f a 
less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government 
must use it.”). 
 149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.17 (2013). 
 150. Id. 
 151. 6410 Code of Student Conduct, WAKE COUNTY PUB. SCH. SYS., http://webarchive. 
wcpss.net/policy-files/series/policies/6410-bp.html (last visited May 2, 2015). 
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record.  Similarly, public schools in Durham County punish bullying in 
“written, electronic, or verbal” forms,152 implying that online bullying can 
be punished.  School boards in less populous counties have adopted similar 
policies.  Columbus County schools, for example, prohibit bullying “at any 
time or place when the behavior has a direct and immediate effect on 
maintaining order and discipline in the schools.”153  These examples are not 
exhaustive, but illustrative, as many other systems across the state have 
adopted similar policies. 
School-board policies cover much of the same conduct contemplated 
by the statute.  For example, a school in Columbus County could 
administratively punish a student for creating a fake social-media profile or 
website directed at a school employee.154  Consider how a Columbus 
County school could respond to the students who created the fake Twitter 
profile portraying Chip Douglas.155  Columbus County schools prohibit 
online bullying “when the behavior has a direct and immediate effect on 
maintaining order and discipline in the schools.”156  Because the fake 
Twitter profile disturbed class time with students laughing at their teacher, 
it caused a “direct and immediate effect on maintaining order and discipline 
in the schools.”157  Thus, a student who creates a parody profile could be 
administratively punished in Columbus County without criminal 
repercussions. 
It is important to note, however, that school discipline is not entirely 
free from First Amendment concerns.  The Third Circuit has held that a 
student cannot be punished for online speech that occurs away from 
school.158  The Fourth Circuit where North Carolina sits, however, allows 
schools to punish online student speech where it “could reasonably be 
expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”159  The 
Fourth Circuit standard, however, does not address the viability of criminal 
 
 152. 4411: Bullying/Harassment, DURHAM PUB. SCHOOLS, http://www.dpsnc.net/pages/ 
Durham_Public_Schools/District/About_DPS/District_Policies/Series_4000_-_Student_Ser 
vices/4411 (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 153. Student Rules and Regulations: Grades K–8, COLUMBUS CTY. SCH. 23 (July 16, 
2012), http://www.columbus.k12.nc.us/k8rulesregs.pdf. 
 154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b)(1). 
 155. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 156. Student Rules and Regulations, supra note 153, at 23. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 
2011) (holding that a school could not punish student speech “reaching beyond the 
schoolyard to impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline”). 
 159. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).  The court 
allowed a student to be administratively punished for creating a social-media page that was 
“dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student.”  Id. at 567. 
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punishment, since it involved only school administrative punishment.160  
Thus, according to Fourth Circuit precedent, North Carolina school boards 
have a license to implement less drastic, noncriminal administrative 
methods to punish teacher cyberbullying.   
Instead of allowing school boards and school officials to continue 
implementing policies that address teacher cyberbullying, the teacher-
cyberbullying statute shifts responsibility to law enforcement.  The 
legislation states that its “sole purpose” is to protect children,161 but, as this 
Comment has explained, the law does not in fact protect any child.  Even if 
the legislative aim is to protect school employees in order to “improve the 
learning environment for North Carolina students,”162 the law is not tailored 
to achieving that end.  Criminal sanctions fail to deter instances of school-
employee cyberbullying and, instead, function only as retribution.  School 
administrative punishment already serves this function and does not result 
in criminal charges against students.  Given the overwhelming burden for 
statutes that restrict speech based on its content under the First 
Amendment, the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute does not 
pass constitutional muster. 
III. THE NORTH CAROLINA TEACHER-CYBERBULLYING  
STATUTE SALVAGED 
While the North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute raises both due 
process and First Amendment concerns, the North Carolina General 
Assembly can revise the statute to rectify these concerns.  This Part 
suggests that the General Assembly take two steps.  First, the legislative 
record should be revised to reflect an accurate and realistic legislative 
purpose.  Second, the statute should only prohibit “true threats.”  Revising 
the statute in this manner would reign in the overly broad coverage of the 
statute, while still allowing punishment for the most disruptive and 
culpable student Internet activity. 
A. Prerequisite to Improvement 
As a prerequisite to any redrafting of the statute, the North Carolina 
General Assembly should revise the legislative record to better reflect the 
 
 160. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“Our 
problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide 
with the rules of the school authorities.”). 
 161. See Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715, 715; see also supra 
text accompanying note 25. 
 162. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715. 
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statute’s intended purpose.  As written, the legislation states that its “sole 
purpose . . . is to protect all children from bullying and harassment,” and 
that “no other legislative purpose is intended nor should any other intent be 
construed from passage of [the] law.”163  Since the teacher-cyberbullying 
statute in fact protects not children, but only adult school employees, from 
bullying and harassment, it fails to achieve its express legislative 
purpose.164  Exacerbating the problem, the General Assembly tied the 
hands of judges to construe the statute by forbidding consideration of any 
other legislative intent.165 
The law seeks to protect school employees, not children, from online 
bullying and harassment.  By protecting school employees from certain 
online student activity, presumably, the General Assembly aims to 
“improve the learning environment for North Carolina students.”166  Before 
making any improvement to the substance of the North Carolina teacher-
cyberbullying statute, the legislative record should be revised to reflect this 
broader, more realistic, legislative end. 
B. The “True Threat” Requirement 
To cure the due process and First Amendment objections, the statute 
should be revised in a manner that only punishes students who 
communicate “true threats” to school employees.  To accomplish this end, 
the word torment should be stricken from the statute.  The remaining 
“intent to intimidate” requirement should be legislatively defined to mean 
“a threat to a [school employee] with the intent of placing the [school 
employee] in fear of bodily harm or death.”  Such a revision would avoid 
the Fourteenth Amendment vagueness problem, as well as the First 
Amendment content-based restriction problem, while still protecting school 
employees and school systems from the most disruptive student Internet 
activity. 
In the 2003 case of Virginia v. Black,167 the Supreme Court of the 
United States defined what speech constitutes “true threats.”168  Black 
involved two defendants accused of violating the same Virginia law, which 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.2(b) (2013). 
 165. See Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (N.C. 
1991) (“In matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of 
the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” (citing State ex rel. Hunt v. N.C. 
Reinsurance Facility, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (N.C. 1981))). 
 166. Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 149, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 715. 
 167. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 168. Id. at 359–60. 
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prohibited cross burning with the intent to intimidate others.169  The first 
defendant burned a cross on the front yard of an African American.170  The 
second defendant burned a cross on private property during a Ku Klux 
Klan rally.171  According to the Court, the First Amendment did not protect 
the first defendant, but shielded the second defendant.172  A majority of the 
Court found that the first defendant’s speech was not protected because 
burning a cross in another’s front yard was “likely to inspire fear of bodily 
harm.”173  As to the second defendant, however, the Court ruled that the act 
of burning a cross on private property, without more, did not constitute a 
true threat, since the same fear of personal injury did not exist.174 
The Court clearly defined “true threats” as “those statements where 
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”175  The speaker need not intend to carry out the threat, but 
only to place another in fear of bodily harm.176 
Proscribing only true threats would avoid due-process vagueness 
concerns by “provid[ing] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited.”177  Unlike the word torment, with its multiple 
inconsistent definitions,178 the Supreme Court has defined intimidate in the 
context of true threats.179  By removing torment from the statute and 
defining intimidate to mean “true threats,” neither the public nor law 
enforcement would have to guess what types of student Internet activity is 
prohibited.  Namely, the crime would only occur when a student possesses 
“the intent of placing [a school employee] in fear of bodily harm or 
death.”180  The intimidation-as-true-threat standard has been approved by 
the Supreme Court of the United States and has developed through 
 
 169. Id. at 348. 
 170. Id. at 350. 
 171. Id. at 348–49. 
 172. Id. at 362–63. 
 173. Id. at 363. 
 174. Id. at 359. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 360 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a 
type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the 
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”). 
 177. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (first citing Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); then citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 
(1972)). 
 178. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
 179. Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 180. Id. 
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subsequent judicial decisions.  As such, the amendment would assuage 
Fourteenth Amendment due-process concerns. 
Overcoming First Amendment content-based objections presents a 
more complex hurdle.  Even if the teacher-cyberbullying law prohibits only 
a category of unprotected speech, such as true threats, it continues to hinge 
on the content of the speech. 
The prohibition on content-based restrictions is so entrenched within 
the First Amendment’s protection that even a law restricting speech within 
the narrow range of permissible areas, such as true threats, may still violate 
the First Amendment.  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,181 a local ordinance 
prohibited fighting words, but only those based on race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender.182  Although fighting words are considered to fall 
outside of the First Amendment’s protection, the Court in R.A.V. held that 
the ordinance failed as a content-based restriction on speech.183  The 
primary problem with the restriction was that the law only applied to 
fighting words that “insult[ed] or provoke[d] violence[] ‘on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”184  Other forms of fighting words, 
such as those based on political affiliation, union membership, or sexual 
orientation, were not covered by the ordinance.185  The Court ruled that the 
First Amendment did not permit the city “to impose special prohibitions on 
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.”186 
The Court, however, did indicate that content-based restrictions within 
a category of unprotected speech would be permissible “[w]hen the basis 
for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire 
class of speech at issue is proscribable.”187  Under this exception, “a 
content-based distinction is permissible if it directly advances the reason 
why the category of speech is unprotected.”188 
The R.A.V. Court identified three principal reasons why the First 
Amendment does not protect true threats: (1) to protect “individuals from 
 
 181. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 182. Id. at 380. 
 183. Id. at 381. 
 184. Id. at 391 (quoting the ordinance at issue in R.A.V.). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (first citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); then citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 
221, 229–30 (1987)). 
 187. Id. at 388. 
 188. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.3, at 
1038 (4th ed. 2011). 
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fear of violence”; (2) to prevent “the disruption that fear engenders”; and 
(3) to prevent “the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”189 
The Court has illustrated the operation of this exception in the context 
of true threats in two cases.    
First, in Virginia v. Black,190 discussed above in this Comment,191 the 
Court found burning a cross with the intent to intimidate proscribable 
because it is “a particularly virulent form of intimidation” that is “most 
likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”192  In other words, a state can prohibit 
cross-burning in order to protect individuals from “fear of violence.”193   
Second, in R.A.V., the Court explained that the federal government 
may not prohibit threats against the President that only reference the 
President’s “policy on aid to inner cities”; but the federal government may 
generally prohibit threats against the President because of the 
overwhelming interest “in allowing him to perform his duties without 
interference from threats of physical violence.”194  Thus, true threats are 
also proscribable in order to prevent “the disruption that fear engenders.”195 
The North Carolina General Assembly should be able to 
constitutionally prohibit students’ online true threats against school 
employees because of the overwhelming state interest in education and 
allowing school employees to perform their educational duties without 
disruptive threats of violence coming from students on the Internet.  In the 
unique context of schools and education, student Internet activity that aims 
to intimidate school employees constitutes a “particularly virulent form of 
intimidation” with great potential to create substantial disruption in schools 
and communities.196  Fear of violence takes away the ability of school 
employees “to focus on educating and supporting students.”197  Instead of 
spending more time on improving the educational environment, the school 
must expend “resources to assure student and building security and address 
discipline issues.”198  Moreover, threats of violence against school 
 
 189. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
 190. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 191. See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. 
 192. Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
 193. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
 194. Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam)). 
 195. Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707). 
 196. Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
 197. PREVENTION INST., FACT SHEET: VIOLENCE AND LEARNING 1 (May 2011), http:// 
www.preventioninstitute.org/component/jlibrary/article/id-301/127.html. 
 198. Id. 
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employees “affect the ability to recruit and maintain a quality of teaching 
and administrative staff in the system.”199 
A student’s threat of violence against a school employee, even if it is 
made online, detracts from the educational environment because of the 
disruption that it engenders.  Punishing student threats against school 
employees is constitutionally permissible in order to prevent that type of 
disruption.200  Such a restriction fits squarely within the R.A.V. 
framework.201 
Revising the legislative record and defining the statute’s intent-to-
intimidate requirement to mean “true threats” would salvage the North 
Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute while still protecting school 
employees and school systems from the most disruptive and culpable forms 
of online student speech––online student activities that are designed to 
intimidate school employees. 
CONCLUSION 
The North Carolina General Assembly has taken a proactive approach 
to preventing the emerging problems of teacher cyberbullying.  
Unfortunately, the current North Carolina teacher-cyberbullying statute 
creates a vague standard that risks chilling student speech.  Restriction on 
student speech in this area is particularly problematic, given that students 
are the most likely to alert the public of teacher misconduct, with the 
Internet serving as their most likely forum.202  This modern problem must 
be met and curbed with realistic, effective, constitutional solutions. 
If lawmakers altered the statute to prohibit only “true threats,” as 
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Black, the public 
would be able to ascertain what the statute forbids, and students would be 
able to adjust their conduct accordingly.203  This would quell vagueness 
concerns under the Due Process Clause. 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (stating that true threats are unprotected to prevent “the 
disruption that fear engenders”). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (observing that through the Internet, 
any person can become “a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox”). 
 203. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Intimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a 
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.”). 
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Freedom-of-speech concerns would also dissipate, as the First 
Amendment would not protect true threats of violence against school 
employees.204  This revision would reign in the broad coverage of the 
statute and still protect school employees and school systems from the most 
serious and disruptive online student misconduct.  Until changes are made, 
however, student speech in North Carolina will remain suppressed due to 
the absence of clear guidelines regarding what types of Internet activity 
will cross the line. 
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 204. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First 
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